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Abstract
Background: Illicit trade of tobacco negatively affects countries’ tobacco control efforts. It leads to lower tobacco
prices and makes tobacco products more accessible to vulnerable populations. In this study, we constructed an
illicit tobacco trade index, which measures the structural and institutional capabilities of 160 countries in addressing
illicit tobacco trade. We collected the most recent and best available data on general governance, tobacco control
policies, and trade and customs practices.
Results: Singapore, New Zealand, Finland and Sweden lead countries with the most favorable illicit tobacco trade
score. We observed a positive relationship between illicit tobacco trade scores and Gross National Income (GNI) per
capita and a negative relationship with the share of illicit tobacco trade to total tobacco consumption.
Conclusions: The capability to combat illicit trade varies across countries. However, on average, low and middleincome countries (LMICs) are less capable of addressing illicit tobacco trade as suggested by the lower illicit
tobacco trade index score. The lower index score in low and middle-income countries was mainly driven by low
scores in tobacco control policies and trade and customs practices and conditions. Our study reinforces the
importance for LMICs to adopt the WHO’s Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Tobacco Trade Products, particularly
committing to treaty obligations and investing on track and trace system and other customs reforms.
Keywords: Tobacco, Illicit trade, Index, Smoking

Introduction
Tobacco smoking kills more than eight million people
every year. Seven million of these preventable deaths are
directly attributed to tobacco use and approximately 1.2
million to second-hand smoking [1]. Controlling illicit tobacco trade (ITT) together with progressive taxation and
supply regulations are effective interventions to decrease
the disease burden caused by smoking. ITT is defined as
the supply, distribution, and sale of smuggled genuine or
counterfeit tobacco products [2]. ITT negatively affects
the tobacco control efforts of countries. It leads to lower
tobacco prices and makes tobacco products; the availability of low-priced illicit tobacco products undermines
* Correspondence: vulep@mail.pids.gov.ph
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tobacco control policy efforts intended to reduce the consumption of tobacco especially to young and poor populations [3]. Also, ITT causes significant damage government
revenue from tobacco tax revenues [4–6]. Annually, governments lose an estimated US$40 billion in tax revenue
from unreported illicit trade of tobacco products [7]. In
some countries, illicit trade can be as high as 50 % of the
overall tobacco market. It has been estimated that 1 in
every 10 cigarettes and tobacco products consumed globally is illicit. ITT is more common in low and middleincome countries (LMICs) [7]. The estimated shares of
illicit cigarettes to total cigarette consumption in lowincome and middle-income countries were 16.8 % and
11.8 %, respectively compared to 9.8 % in high-income
countries [8].
ITT could be attributed to multiple demand and supply factors. Demand factors refer to the preferences of
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smokers for cheaper or specific tobacco products, while
supply factors refer to activities of legal and illegal business entities to increase profit, sales, and market shares
enabled by the presence of corruption and organized
crime, and weak government institutions [9]. Given the
multi-dimensional construct of ITT, a holistic measure
of these factors is needed in order to identify the appropriate policy response. We constructed an index, which
measures the capacity of 160 economies in addressing
ITT. The index score does not measure the effectiveness
of countries in addressing illicit tobacco trade. Rather,
the index examines their structural and institutional capacity to combat it. We have identified 29 indicators related to intellectual property rights, corruption, rule of
law, organized crime, government effectiveness, informality, tax administration, tobacco tax policies, supplyside tobacco regulations, customs and trade practices.
We further categorized these indicators into three: (1)
general governance, (2) tobacco control policies, and (3)
customs and trade practices.
There are several related indices such as illicit trade
environment and tobacco interference indices [10, 11].
However, to our knowledge, the ITT index is the first of
its kind that attempts to consider a wide-range of variables in the development of index specifically for illicit
tobacco. The ITT Index could be used as a diagnostic
tool for governments in examining countries’ capacity in
addressing illicit tobacco trade. However, like most indices, it must be complemented with a more in-depth
examination to fully understand the contextual challenges in addressing illicit trade of tobacco products in a
particular country. It could also be used for benchmarking exercises amongst countries, which is effective in
stimulating debate and call for action.

Methods
We followed five steps in constructing an ITT index.
The first step was developing a theoretical framework,
which is essential in defining ITT and in identifying relationships of the different factors of illicit trade. Our
framework informed the identification and selection of
variables to be included in the index. We conducted an
extensive literature search of quantitative studies to
identify these different drivers of ITT. We did a search
of PubMed using the search terms “Illicit tobacco trade”,
“illegal cigarette”, “smuggling”, “factors”, “determinants”,
“modelling”, in various combinations. We did not use
any language or date restrictions. We did the same
search on Google Scholar. We searched resources from
relevant websites that publishes gray literature. We recorded all the factors that show positive relationships in
quantitative studies. We categorized these factors into
three domains: general governance, supply and demand
tobacco control policies, and trade and customs
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practices. Figure 1 shows the theoretical framework we
developed in this study, which demonstrates the relationships of different enabling factors, which lead to
higher supply of illicit tobacco then higher tobacco consumption. General governance refers to structures and
processes that are designed to ensure accountability,
transparency, responsiveness, rule of law, stability, empowerment, and broad-based participation. Empirical
studies have demonstrated that ineffective governance,
corruption, instability of government, presence of organized crimes, weak law enforcement, presence of informal channels, and ineffective tax administration are
determinants of ITT [9]. Typically, large scale illicit tobacco trade is conducted by organized criminal networks, flourishes in environments characterized by weak
governance, high levels of corruption, and lax law enforcement [12, 13]. In environment with weak governance, transnational tobacco companies (TTC) complicity
engage in large-scale cigarette smuggling as part of their
strategy to increase profit [14]. Also, tobacco control
policies such as imposition of higher taxes and supplyside interventions (that is, the adaption of smoke-free
environment free regulations) also affects the demand
for tobacco products. While the link between price and
tax structure and ITT remains contentious, tobacco control policies are important factors affecting ITT. In general, ITT is higher in countries with lower cigarette
prices and lower tax rates [15–19]. Lastly, customs
and trade practices exacerbate the inherent challenges
in addressing ITT [20]. Factors under this domain include the limited capacity of customs in terms of
technology, tools and manpower to track trade and
distribution. Weak customs governance, including
corruption could facilitate smuggling and illegal trade
of tobacco products [21–23].
The second step in constructing an index was variable
selection. In general, the validity of indices is largely
dependent on the quality of the underlying variables. In
selecting relevant variables as measures of a particular
construct (e.g., intellectual property), we only included
data with well-documented and transparent methodology

Fig. 1 Theoretical Framework
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that can be accessed online. The methodology includes
detailed data source and estimation procedures. We used
latest survey estimates from the World Bank (e.g., World
Enterprise Survey, World Logistics Survey), World Health
Organization (e.g., tobacco prices and taxes estimates),
and World Economic Forum (e.g., Global Competitiveness
Survey). We have addressed missing data using group
mean imputation [24]. By group mean imputation, we replaced missing data with the mean value of income grouping (that is, based GNI per capita) which the missing
record belongs to. Appendix A material shows the variables we used in the construction of ITT index score, including the data source.
The third step was data normalization. We conducted
data standardization using Min-Max method by subtracting the minimum value and dividing by the range of
the indicator values. This is done by subtracting the
minimum value of the indicator and dividing by the
range of the indicator values:
I ij ¼

xij  minðxi Þ
maxðxi Þ  minðxi Þ

where I ij is the standardized value of the ith indicator
for the jth country
xij is the actual value of the ith indicator for the jth
country
minðxi Þ is the minimum value of the ith indicator
across all countries
maxðxi Þ is the maximum value of the ith indicator
across all countries
This method transformed the indicators previously
measured in different scales into normalized indices with
identical range of values between 0 and 1 [20].
The fourth step was data aggregation. Indicators under
each domain were then aggregated to obtain a single
measurement score per dimension. Under the normative
assumption that each domain is equally important in the
assessment as a whole, equal weighting is applied in aggregating the individual indicators under each domain.
Hence, the maximum score in each dimension is 33.3 %
or, more accurately, 1/3. In equal weighting, each domain has the same importance when determining the
index’s value. Typically, composite indices rely on equal
weighting largely because of the insufficient empirical or
quantitative basis of the weights. In this study, while unequal weighting seems appropriate given the contextual
differences across countries, the lack of consensus on
weights makes unequal weighting seems justifiable.
The overall score was computed as the geometric
mean of the three-dimension indices. We used geometric mean because it offers a partial compensability between indicators. The geometric aggregation formula of
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sub-indicators to compute the composite score (ITT)
takes the following form:
 
Pn
j wj ln SIj
ITT ¼ exp Pn
j¼1 wj
ITT is the composite index to be computed, wj is the
relative weight of the sub-domain SI j , n is the number of
sub-domain (n=3) aggregated to form the composite indicator and exp and ln are the exponential and logarithmic functions respectively. This approach in creating a
composite score using equal weighting and geometric
aggregation is similar to the methodology used by the
Human Development Index (HDI). The higher the ITT
score (that is, 0=lowest; 1=highest) the less vulnerable to
illicit tobacco trade. There are various aggregation
methods discussed elsewhere including their advantages
and disadvantages [24].
Lastly, we conducted bivariate analysis with the share
of illicit tobacco trade to tobacco consumption. We obtained data on illicit tobacco trade and smoking prevalence from Euromonitor International and World Health
Organization, respectively. Despite its potential limitations, we used data on illicit tobacco trade from Euromonitor International in order check the validity of ITT
because it is the only source of complete and comparable data on value and volume on illicit trade across a
large number of countries.
While the index captures the enabling factors of
ITT, it is important to triangulate the ITT Index
scores with the size of the tobacco market in a particular country. Here, we adjusted the ITT score with
smoking prevalence of the country using the formula
[adjusted ITT=(1-(prevalence/100)) x ITT overall
score], which should yield to a more realistic score.
By applying this formula, countries with high prevalence of smoking will lead to lower adjusted ITT
score, meaning more vulnerable to ITT.

Results
Table 1 shows the mean values of variables included in
constructing ITT scores for 160 countries disaggregated
by income group (i.e., Gross National Income per capita).
The countries were categorized as low-income if GNI per
capita is $1,025 or less in 2018; lower middle-income
economies are those with a GNI per capita between
$1,026 and $3,995; upper middle-income economies are
those between $3,996 and $12,375; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,376 or more.
Our descriptive analysis suggests that GNI per capita is
highly correlated with trade and custom practices and
governance, tobacco control policies, and general governance indicators. Relative to other low and income countries, high-income countries have relatively favorable trade
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Table 1 Variables used for the construction of ITTScore index
Domains

Sub-domain

Variable

OECD

Non-OECD

LIC

LMIC

UMIC

World

Governance

Intellectual property

Extent of intellectual property rights
(lowest: 1; highest: 7)

5.4

4.8

3.5

3.7

3.8

4.2

Extent are property rights, including financial
assets, protected (lowest: 1; highest: 7)

5.4

4.9

3.7

3.9

4.0

4.3

Firms experiencing bribes (%)

2.9

5.7

23.6

23.5

12.6

14.3

Public transactions where a gift or informal
payment was requested (%)

2.1

4.2

18.4

19.0

9.8

11.2

Firms expected to give gifts in meetings
with tax officials (%)

1.0

3.7

18.6

17.9

10.3

10.9

Firms expected to give gifts to secure
government contract (%)

7.0

3.5

36.7

31.8

20.1

21.0

Firms expected to give gifts to get an
operating license (%)

3.1

5.9

20.8

18.3

9.7

11.8

% of firms expected to give gifts to get
an import license

0.4

4.0

17.4

19.2

9.6

10.7

% of firms expected to give gifts to public
officials "to get things done"

7.9

9.6

30.2

32.7

13.1

19.2

% of firms identifying the courts system as
a major constraint

12.0

14.3

39.9

39.9

34.4

29.8

Favoritism of government officials to
well-connected firms and individuals when
deciding upon policies and contracts
(lowest: 1; highest: 7)

3.9

3.7

2.9

3.0

2.8

3.2

Independence of judicial system from
influences of the government, individuals,
or companies (lowest: 1; highest: 7)

5.3

4.6

3.2

3.5

3.5

4.0

Extent of organized crime (mafia-oriented
racketeering, extortion) impose costs on
businesses (lowest: 1; highest: 7)

5.6

5.7

4.3

4.3

4.3

4.7

Reliability of police services (lowest: 1; highest: 7)

5.7

5.2

3.8

3.8

3.9

4.4

Extent of public trust in politicians
(lowest: 1; highest: 7)

4.0

3.9

2.8

2.9

2.6

3.1

Extent of burden of government regulation
(lowest: 1; highest: 7)

3.5

3.9

3.6

3.4

3.2

3.5

Transparency of government policymaking
(lowest: 1; highest: 7)

4.9

4.7

3.7

3.8

4.0

4.2

Firms competing against unregistered or
informal firms (%)

28.6

44.9

61.5

55.4

50.6

48.5

Firms identifying practices of competitors
in the informal sector as a major constraint (%)

16.2

21.0

35.4

32.1

28.1

27.0

Tax administration

Percent of firms identifying tax administration
as a major constraint (%)

18.5

14.0

27.8

25.6

23.0

22.4

Demand-related

Price of cigarette per pack (in USD)

8.7

8.9

3.3

3.9

6.6

6.1

Tax burden of cigarette (% share of retail price)

56.4

40.9

20.1

33.1

40.8

38.7

Affordability (% share of per capita income)

2.7

2.0

18.0

7.6

4.3

6.8

Price dispersion Share of cheapest brand price
in premium brand price (%) (the higher the
% the smaller the gap)

77.1

59.9

28.4

42.6

53.5

52.2

Supply restriction

Compliance to smoke free environment
(lowest: 0; highest: 10)

8.5

8.5

3.8

4.2

5.6

5.9

Trade policies and
customs practices

Efficiency of customs and border management
clearance (lowest: 1; highest: 5)

3.5

3.0

2.2

2.4

2.5

2.7

Quality of trade and transport infrastructure
(lowest: 1; highest: 5)

3.7

3.1

2.1

2.3

2.6

2.7

Competence and quality of logistics services
(lowest: 1; highest: 5)

3.7

3.1

2.3

2.5

2.6

2.8

Ability to track and trace consignments
(lowest: 1; highest: 5)

3.8

3.1

2.4

2.6

2.7

2.9

Corruption

Rule of law

Organized crime

Government
effectiveness

Informality

Tobacco control policies

Trade policies and
customs practices

Note: OECD= Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; LIC=Low Income Country; LMIC=Lower Middle-Income Country; UPMIC=Upper Middle-Income
Country; HIC=High Income Country
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Table 2 ITT index, by income group
General governance

Tobacco control policies

Trade and customs

Overall (adjusted)

High-income: OECD

0.45

0.54

0.79

0.57

High-income: non-OECD

0.40

0.47

0.49

0.44

Low-income

0.38

0.26

0.22

0.28

Lower middle-income

0.38

0.28

0.30

0.31

Upper middle-income

0.34

0.40

0.36

0.36

World

0.38

0.39

0.37

0.36

and customs practices and general governance environments. Also, they have better tobacco control policies
using demand and supply policy interventions, including
higher tobacco prices, higher taxes, and lower tobacco
price dispersion. Lastly, they are more compliant to
smoke-free environment policies.
ITT Index is ranked on a scale from 0 to 1.0, with 1.0
being the highest capacity score to address illicit tobacco. Table 2 shows the ITT Index scores by domain
and income group. On average, high-income countries
tend to have higher overall ITT scores compared to
LMICs (median overall score: 0.55 vs. 0.31). Figure 2
shows the negative relationship between GNI per capita
and overall score (R=67; p=0.000). While high-income
countries tend to have higher scores across the three domains (i.e., general governance, tobacco control policies,
and trade and customs practices), their contribution to
the overall score markedly vary across income group.
For instance, trade and customs practices appear to be
the major driver of higher scores in high-income countries, but this is not the case for LMICs. Trade and customs practices and tobacco control policies appear to be
the major drivers of relatively low ITT scores in lowincome countries (median: 0.22). In Appendix B shows
the overall and domain ITT Index score for 160
countries.
Table 3 shows the countries with the highest ITT
index score ranked by country disaggregated by income group. The countries with the most favorable

Fig. 2 ITT Index Score vs. Share of Illicit Tobacco Trade

ITT scores are the following: Singapore, New Zealand,
Australia, Finland and Sweden. While countries with
least favorable ITT Index scores are Afghanistan,
Libya, Iraq.
We examined the relationship between the share ITT
and ITT Index score countries with 2017 data from
Euromonitor International. Of the 160 countries included in the analysis, we only have data on illicit trade
for 78 countries. The average share of illicit trade is 17 %
ranging from 4 to 54 %. Our bivariate analysis shows a
statistically significant correlation between ITT score
and the share of ITT to total consumption (R=0.56; p
value:0.03). The average ITT score for those countries
with higher share of ITT (that is, above the global mean:
16 %) is 0.35 compared to 0.48 in countries with lower
shares. However, the caveats of available ITT estimates
should be taken with caution. There is almost always a
large discrepancy across estimates from academia, tobacco industry, and other organizations. Based on empirical studies, industry estimates of illicit tobacco is
likely higher than those from academic studies. For example, Clarke and Prentice (2012) noted that the discrepancy between estimates from the industrycommissioned studies relative to academic studies (16 %
versus 3 %) [25].
Figure 3 shows the statistically significant relationship between adjusted ITT Index score and ITT as
share of total cigarette consumption (p value: 0.04).
The ITT index scores of European countries especially those with high smoking prevalence, particularly
Greece, Estonia, Croatia, Cyprus, and Czech Republic
have large decline in their ITT scores. For middleincome countries, we observed substantially lower adjusted ITT score for Indonesia and Turkey, both
countries with relatively high smoking prevalence.
After adjustment, the mean overall ITT score declined from 0.38 to 0.31 across 160 countries. The
ITT score of high-income OECD countries decreased
from 0.55 to 0.43. While LMICs have small difference
in adjusted and adjusted ITT index scores. See Appendix B for the adjusted and unadjusted ITT Index
Score with the domain score of general governance,
tobacco control policies, and trade and customs practices for each 160 countries.
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Table 3 Top countries with highest ITT index
Overall rank

Country

GNI per capita
(2018) in USD

General
governance

Tobacco control
policies

Trade and
customs

Overall
(adjusted)

High-income countries (OECD and non-OECD)
1

Singapore

58,770

0.90

0.66

0.91

0.69

2

New Zealand

40,640

0.90

0.69

0.86

0.69

3

Australia

53,230

0.82

0.65

0.83

0.67

4

Finland

48,280

0.91

0.62

0.90

0.66

5

Sweden

55,490

0.87

0.52

0.91

0.65

Low and middle-income countries (LMICs)
54

India

2,020

0.61

0.43

0.54

0.49

53

Sri Lanka

4,060

0.63

0.66

0.35

0.47

41

Malaysia

10,590

0.66

0.46

0.56

0.45

49

South Africa

5,750

0.73

0.34

0.60

0.44

47

Mauritius

12,050

0.70

0.51

0.45

0.44

Discussion
To measure the overall capacity of countries in addressing illicit tobacco, we constructed the Illicit Tobacco
Trade (ITT) Index, which is the average capacity of
countries in three dimensions: (1) general governance,
(2) tobacco control policies, and (3) trade and customs
practices. The ITT Index score is the geometric mean of
normalized indices of the three dimensions.
ITT index is ranked on a scale from 0 to 1.0, with 1.0
being the highest capacity score to address illicit tobacco. The average global ITT Index score is 0.36, with
a large variation across countries. The relatively low global average suggests that many countries around the
world have a significant room to improve their capacity
in addressing illicit tobacco trade. On average, low and
middle-income countries (LMICs) have lower capacity
compared to their high-income counterparts in addressing ITT. Our bivariate analysis shows a strong positive
relationship between ITT scores and GNI per capita.
However, it is interesting to note that there are several

Fig. 3 ITT Index Score and Share of Illicit Trade

LIC and LMIC that have impressively high ITT Index
scores. A deep-dive analysis could be performed to
understand why these countries have higher ITT Index
score compared to other countries with more or less
similar income.
The relatively higher vulnerability of LMICs could
have contributed to the proliferation of illicit tobacco
products in developing countries, which made tobacco
more accessible and affordable especially to vulnerable
populations. The tobacco epidemic is growing in developing countries largely because of weak tobacco control
policies and the globalization of the tobacco industry. In
recent decades, the growing presence of transnational
tobacco corporations (TTC) in developing countries has
changed the production and marketing of tobacco products in emerging markets. Reports suggest that TTCs
have contributed to the increasing demand for tobacco
by undermining regulations, and in some jurisdictions,
and have engaged in illicit trade such as smuggling to
maximize profit [14].
The ITT Index score is positively correlated with national income. However, the contribution of different dimensions to the overall ITT Index scores varies across
income groups. For example, in HIC, the trade and custom domain appears to be the driver of a higher ITT
Index score. In contrast, tobacco control policies and
trade and customs practices domains are drivers of
LMICs and UMICs. The lower index score in tobacco
control domain among low and middle-income countries reinforces the need to implement the WHO Framework for Tobacco Control (FCTC), particularly the
adoption of high and simple tobacco taxes. On average,
prices of tobacco remain affordable and tax burden are
substantially lower in developing countries [26]. Political
will is needed in legislating progressive tobacco tax regime. However, governments are more often hesitant in
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imposing higher taxes out of fear of possible increase in
higher illicit tobacco activities, a scare tactic commonly
used by the tobacco industry to block tax reforms [27].
While the lower scores on customs and trade highlights
the importance for developing countries to adopt the
WHO’s Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Tobacco Trade
Products. For example, developing countries should
commit to the treaty obligations and invest on systems
such as track and trace and other customs reforms.
The ITT Index score does not measure the magnitude
of illicit tobacco, but could be used to diagnose the capacity of countries to address the problem. It should
stimulate discussions among policy makers and researchers of countries, and consider it as a diagnostic
tool and precursor in conducting a more in-depth analysis of the different adaptive challenges of addressing
illicit tobacco. This should be complemented with mixed
method designs to fully understand the drivers of illicit
tobacco trade in a given jurisdictions. For example, in
the case of Afghanistan and Pakistan, two countries considering the relatively lower tax regime and complex political systems and criminal actors in the former, which
exacerbates tobacco smuggling [28].
Our study has the following limitations. First, we conducted imputation of missing data for selected variables
because of the lack available data. While our imputation
method is a commonly used approach, no imputation
model is free of assumption and possible bias. Mean
group imputations typically reduces variance and could
distort relationships between variables.
In our study, the bivariate analysis of ITT score and
share of illicit tobacco trade could have resulted into a
bias estimate. Second, like most indices, there are innate
limitations of different aggregation approaches. We used
geometric approach for aggregation with the attempt to
address the compensatory problem commonly found in
other methods such as linear aggregation methods. Typically, countries with low scores in a particular subdomain would prefer a linear approach rather than geometric as the domain with high score will compensate
the domain with low score. The geometric method reduces this problem; we assumed that all domains are
conceptually equal. However, based on empirical studies,
some variables have more economical, clinical and social
relevance over others. Further studies are needed to address this possible methodological limitation.

Conclusions
We constructed an index, which aims to guide governments in measuring their overall capability in addressing
illicit tobacco trade. Our findings suggest the highly
heterogenous capacity across countries. LMICs, on average, appear to be less capable in addressing illicit tobacco trade as suggested by the relatively low scores.
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The relatively lower index score in LMICs was largely
driven by low scores in tobacco control policies and
trade and customs practices and conditions. This therefore reinforces the need to fully implement the FCTC
Protocol WHO’s Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Tobacco
Trade Products in LMICs particularly the adoption of
large and simple tax rates for tobacco and customs
reforms.
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